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 “Dollars Versus [Equality] Rights”:1 
Money and the Limits on  
Distributive Justice 
Hester A. Lessard* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Questions about the constraints “money” places on justice, what 
Binnie J. in his reasons for the Court in Newfoundland (Treasury Board) 
v. Newfoundland and Labrador Assn. of Public and Private Employees 
called the “dollars versus rights controversy”,2 arise frequently in the 
adjudication of rights claims under the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms.3 They are particularly salient in the social benefit challenges 
under section 15, the Charter’s equality guarantee, in which equality is 
invoked to argue that a governmental benefit or program exacerbates 
inequality by not going far enough in its coverage or because of dis-
criminatory under-inclusiveness. Government parties often respond to 
such challenges by asserting that cost factors — the strain on government 
budgets, the need to channel financial resources in other directions — 
explain and justify the alleged inequality. The tension between scarcity 
and justice that structures this exchange between rights holders and 
governments lies at the heart of conceptions of distributive justice. 
                                                                                                             
* University of Victoria. I wish to thank the organizers, Professors Jamie Cameron, Sonia 
Lawrence, Ben Berger and James Stribopoulos, of the 15th Annual Constitutional Cases Conference, 
May 4, 2012, at which this paper was presented. I wish also to thank Kate Feeney and Ashley Caron, 
my able research assistants at the University of Victoria. Special thanks are owed to Professor Sonia 
Lawrence for organizing the “Money and Justice (Limits on Rights)” panel and for encouraging me 
to follow through with the completion of this paper, and to Professors Lawrence and Cameron for 
their thoughtful comments on earlier drafts. Finally, I am indebted to my colleague Gillian Calder 
who provided, at very short notice, helpful substantive comments as well as numerous editorial 
suggestions on the penultimate draft. All errors, oversights and misperceptions are my own. 
1 Justice Binnie, for the Court, in Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v. Newfoundland and 
Labrador Assn. of Public and Private Employees, [2004] S.C.J. No. 61, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 381, at 
para. 65 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “NAPE”]. 
2 Id. 
3 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
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The mechanisms for state redistributive efforts range from taxation 
provisions, to labour market adjustments, to direct distribution of 
financial benefits such as income assistance, and to the distribution of 
goods in kind such as medical care or child care. The latter two vehicles 
— social welfare programs — are associated in Canada and other 
western democracies with the brief heyday, in the first two or three 
decades following the Second World War, of the liberal welfare state. 
Reinforced by the political optimism and economic prosperity of that era, 
liberal polities such as Canada displayed a relatively strong commitment 
to distributive justice and, in varying degrees, to public responsibility in 
that regard.4 The programs for social support developed during this era, 
albeit typically amended and often reduced in generosity and scope, are 
the focus of the social benefit cases. Taken together, the cases raise the 
question of whether an equality litigant, no matter how convincing his or 
her claim of inequality, can win if the cost to governments is too high. 
This volume celebrates the Charter’s 30th anniversary. Our Charter 
has come of age in a neo-liberal era, one in which whatever political 
consensus there once was regarding distributive justice has splintered 
and dissolved. It is also an era in which courts do not hesitate to ask 
where and when “dollars” should trump rights, and where and when the 
market, rather than the state, should be left to distribute the basic re-
sources on which individual security depends. Indeed, in Chaoulli v. 
Québec (Attorney General), a number of judges embrace the notion that 
the market is the ultimate source of security for individual Canadians and 
that government efforts at redistribution, such as the national medical 
care program, should not impede access to the market by economically 
advantaged individuals seeking a faster, more efficient satisfaction of 
their basic medical needs.5 Under this model, the private (individual) not 
                                                                                                             
4 It is important not to overstate the progressive character of welfare state regimes and 
politics during this historical period. Much scholarship has pointed out the racist and (hetero)sexist 
character of the programs put in place during this era, as well as their middle-class bias. See 
discussion of this literature in Hester Lessard, “Substantive Universality: Reconceptualizing 
Feminist Approaches to Social Provision and Child Care”, in Shelley A.M. Gavigan & Dorothy E. 
Chunn, The Legal Tender of Gender: Law, Welfare and the Regulation of Women’s Poverty (Oxford 
and Portland, OR: Hart, 2010) 217, at 222-23 and in Hester Lessard, “The Empire of the Lone 
Mother: Parental Rights, Child Welfare Law, and State Restructuring” (2002) 39(4) Osgoode Hall 
L.J. 717 [hereinafter “Empire of the Lone Mother”]. Nevertheless, a key marker of the shift in 
political values from welfare liberalism to neo-liberalism is the diminished notion of collective state 
responsibility for individual human need. Id. 
5 [2005] S.C.J. No. 33, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Chaoulli”]. See in par-
ticular the judgment by McLachlin C.J.C. and Major J., with whom Bastarache J. agreed. See also 
the reasons by Deschamps J. which, although based on the Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, 
R.S.Q. c. C-12, express a similar view.  
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the public (state) has a primary and relatively enlarged responsibility for 
well-being. 
In this paper, I review the Supreme Court of Canada’s equality deci-
sions, from 1985 to the present, that fall roughly within the category of 
social benefit challenges, namely, challenges to public programs or 
initiatives that distribute goods in kind or in cash.6 The rights claims in 
these cases — a cohort of 13 — directly require governments to expend 
money, leading courts and commentators to refer to the “positive” nature 
of equality rights. It has long been argued by advocates of such interpre-
tations and of the entrenchment of socio-economic rights, that many 
procedural rights, as well as rights that are generally characterized as 
“negative”, also may entail large government expenditures.7 The point 
made is that the reluctance of courts to recognize claims that have a 
“positive” component simply because, as such, they entail government 
expenditures, is not warranted. I agree with that argument. However, one 
of my purposes in this paper is to explore how judges at our highest court 
engage with the budgetary impacts on governments of rights recognition. 
Thus, it makes methodological sense to focus on the social benefit cases, 
given that they are more clearly perceived by judges to be about redistri-
bution and about a public responsibility for social provision that is 
                                                                                                             
6 To identify this cohort of cases, I started with the list of all S.C.C. equality cases com-
piled for the study by Bruce Ryder et al., “What’s Law Good For? An Empirical Overview of 
Charter Equality Decisions” in P. Monahan & J. Cameron, eds. (2004) 24 S.C.L.R. (2d) 103, at 
Appendix A [hereinafter “Ryder et al.”]. I updated it to the present and then winnowed out the 
benefits cases. I included NAPE even though it is not a social benefit case because it concerns a 
direct financial award to rectify a (pay equity) inequality. It is also, of course, a key case in the 
“dollars versus rights” jurisprudence. I hemmed and hawed over whether or not to include Health 
Services and Support – Facilities Sector Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia, [2007] S.C.J. No. 27, 
[2007] 2 S.C.R. 391 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Health Services”], which is also not a social benefit case 
in the narrow sense used here. It concerned the distribution of and respect for collective bargaining 
rights. The financial implications for government budgets lay at the heart of the case and of many of 
the arguments made by the B.C. government. However, in the end I excluded it because it did not fit 
the social benefit template, although I do reference it in the discussion of doctrinal approaches to 
factoring “public purse” impacts into s. 1 analysis. See discussion infra, at note 109. 
7 See, for example, R. v. Askov, [1990] S.C.J. No. 106, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1199 (S.C.C.) 
addressing the right of the accused to be tried within a reasonable time. See also the discussion of 
Singh v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1985] S.C.J. No. 11, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 
177 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Singh”], infra, at notes 85-89. Finally, see also the discussion of Askov 
and other similar procedural fairness cases in Patrick Macklem & Craig Scott, “Constitutional Ropes 
of Sand or Justiciable Guarantees? Social Rights in a New South African Constitution” (1992) 
141(1) U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, at 48 to 53. Macklem and Scott argue that courts in liberal societies have 
routinely interpreted so-called “negative” civil and political rights in a manner that imposes positive 
obligations on governments to take steps that often involve the significant expenditure of financial 
resources. The social benefit cases do not require that deconstructive analysis, as they are more 
commonly perceived as entailing positive financial obligations on governments. 
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financially burdensome. Finally, it is useful to distinguish my selected 
cohort from the companion cohort of “private” benefit cases, namely, 
equality cases in which similar arguments about discriminatory under-
inclusion and inequality are made in relation to access to private, rather 
than public, sources of support, such as spousal support under family law 
regimes or coverage under accident insurance regimes. This latter cohort 
raises its own set of questions about distributive justice and neo-liberal 
politics, in particular about the relative willingness of judicial actors to 
articulate robust commitments to redistribution when the burden is viewed 
as a private individual rather than public collective responsibility.8 
In both cohorts — the social or public benefit cases and the private 
benefit cases — the theoretical question about where responsibility for 
individual social security resides, to which the Chaoulli plurality gave a 
neo-liberal answer, is not always explicitly discussed. However, it hovers 
in the background, shaping the “common sense” that underpins judicial 
line-drawing and parsing of alternatives. As already noted, many of the 
regimes challenged in the social benefit cases developed in the very 
different political climate of the post-war era. Given that Charter juris-
prudence commenced in earnest in the mid and late 1980s, the cases 
explored in this paper, as in Chaoulli, sometimes represent a complex 
encounter between two political rationalities, one welfare liberal and the 
other neo-liberal.9 
There are two principled justifications typically offered in the case 
law for judicial reluctance to find in favour of rights claims where doing 
so would entail significant expenditures by governments. The first is the 
institutional limitations concern, namely, that courts lack the institutional 
competence to make complex budgetary decisions. The second is the 
legitimacy or separation of powers concern, namely, that decisions with a 
significant budgetary impact lie outside the appropriate constitutional 
role of the judicial branch in relation to the legislative branch. The 
competence concern has been thoughtfully and critically analyzed, with a 
particular focus on its deployment in anti-poverty litigation, by David 
Wiseman.10 Legitimacy concerns have been a key theme in the work of 
                                                                                                             
8 See discussion in “Empire of the Lone Mother”, supra, note 4, at 745-46. 
9 Colleen Sheppard, Inclusive Equality: The Relational Dimensions of Systemic Discrimi-
nation in Canada (Montréal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010), at 51-57, 
analyzing how conceptions of government that more generally inform the political discourse in a 
given historical period can shape judicial interpretations of rights and limits on rights under the 
Charter. 
10 David Wiseman, “Competence Concerns in Charter Adjudication: Countering the Anti-
Poverty Incompetence Argument” (2006) 51 McGill L.J. 503 [hereinafter “Competence Concerns”]; 
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Andrew Petter.11 This paper does not delve into those institutional and 
normative considerations, but rather pursues two more modest objectives. 
The first objective is to examine the relation between the public cost 
of rights recognition in each of the cases in my selected cohort and the 
pattern of wins and losses. In other words, this objective is about noting 
the purported price of rights recognition in each Supreme Court of 
Canada section 15 social benefits case, and then charting the correlation 
with success or defeat of the rights claim. I did my best to find the dollar 
figure that the Court itself or the government parties used as an estimate 
of budgetary impact. Most of the time, where that impact has been a key 
element in the arguments put forward by government parties, I have not 
needed to look beyond the judgments themselves. In some of the cases, I 
have referred to the decisions below to find a figure. In others, I have 
resorted to print media accounts of government claims about budgetary 
impacts. In one case, I was fortunate to have counsel for one of the 
parties help me establish a rough estimate. In a few, I found it impossible 
to find anything very concrete.12 
Given that my ultimate goal is to arrive at a more precise mapping of 
how the Supreme Court of Canada takes account of the limits “money” 
places on justice, it makes sense to use the dollar figure that is actually in 
play in the litigation rather than to attempt to establish the “real” or 
actual cost. However, it soon became evident that the manner of calculat-
ing budgetary impacts varied quite significantly from case to case. In 
some, the “past injustice” amount, namely, the cost of repairing the 
injustice done to the claimants, is the benchmark. In others, it is the 
future burden on governments if they are obliged to extend a benefit to 
an expanded, more inclusive class of beneficiaries. Sometimes, it is a 
combination of both. By itself, this variation raises questions that need 
to be more clearly addressed. I return to this and similar points in the 
conclusion of this paper. 
My second objective is to outline the doctrinal tools offered by the 
case law for factoring the public cost of rights recognition into Charter 
analysis. For this second task, I looked at the same range of cases plus a 
few additional ones in which key propositions about “dollars versus 
                                                                                                             
and “Taking Competence Seriously” in Margot Young et al., eds., Poverty: Rights, Social 
Citizenship and Legal Activism (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2007), at 263-80. 
11 Andrew Petter, The Politics of the Charter: The Illusive Promise of Constitutional Rights 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010). 
12 A future research agenda may allow for more thorough research into court records and 
facta. However, that was not possible within the time frame for this paper. 
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rights” have been articulated. Key to this discussion regarding doctrinal 
approaches is the overall framework for Charter analysis. As the juris-
prudence has developed, assumptions and questions have recurred about 
which of the three main steps in a typical Charter analysis — the rights 
analysis, the section 1 limitation, or the remedy stage, or all three — is 
the appropriate point at which to factor in the budgetary impact of rights 
recognition. 
I have divided this paper into two parts to explore these two objec-
tives. I then conclude with some reflections on the gaps and inconsisten-
cies in the case law. In my view, it is unrealistic to expect courts to 
seriously engage with questions of distributive justice under the Charter 
unless there is a better, more transparent approach to assessing budgetary 
impacts and to factoring them into the overall framework for adjudicat-
ing rights. 
II. WHAT HAS THE SUPREME COURT DONE? THE COST OF RIGHTS 
RECOGNITION AND THE PATTERN OF WINS AND LOSSES 
If you look at the cases simply in terms of budgetary impacts, i.e., 
the cost of rights recognition, a pattern emerges. The pattern is quite 
stark. All the cases that are successful are ones in which rights recogni-
tion is costless, is of comparatively low cost, or is characterized by the 
Court as an inexpensive or even money-saving outcome. All the cases in 
which rights recognition is “expensive” fail. Some “inexpensive” claims 
also fail, but that does not alter the “follow the money” pattern.13 I will 
examine in chronological order the five successful cases first, followed 
by the eight unsuccessful cases. 
1. Cases in which the Claim Was Successful 
The successful cases are Tétreault-Gadoury v. Canada (Employment 
and Immigration Commission),14 Schachter v. Canada,15 Eldridge v. 
British Columbia (Attorney General),16 Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compen-
sation Board) v. Martin; Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. 
                                                                                                             
13 The same conclusion is reached by David Wiseman in “Competence Concerns”, supra, 
note 10, at 528, in a study that looks at a slightly different collection of cases. 
14 [1991] S.C.J. No. 41, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 22 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Tétreault-Gadoury”]. 
15 [1992] S.C.J. No. 68, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Schachter”]. 
16 [1997] S.C.J. No. 86, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Eldridge”]. 
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Laseur17 and Canada (Attorney General) v. Hislop.18 Tétreault-Gadoury 
is the first “dollars versus rights” equality case. Marcelle Tétreault-
Gadoury challenged the exclusion of persons over the age of 65 from 
eligibility for full benefits under the Unemployment Insurance Act 
1971.19 She was successful at the Federal Court of Appeal, whereupon 
the federal government repealed the exclusionary provision retroactive to 
the date of the decision, namely, September 23, 1988. However, Ms. 
Tétreault-Gadoury turned 65 before that date, but after the equality 
provisions came into force on April 17, 1985. Consequently, she repre-
sented a significant but numerically fixed group of persons whose claims 
remained unsatisfied, and pursued her claim to the Supreme Court of 
Canada. A unanimous Court, in reasons written by La Forest J. for 
himself and Lamer C.J.C., found in her favour. Justice La Forest adopted 
Lacombe J.’s observation at the Federal Court of Appeal that the federal 
scheme “permanently deprives the applicant, and any other person of her 
age, of the status of a socially insured person by making her a pensioner 
of the state, even if she is still looking for a new job ... [She] must at that 
point become the complete responsibility of the special social assistance 
programs of the government...”.20 Justice La Forest, at the minimal 
impairment stage of the section 1 analysis, also commented that La-
combe J. “properly” noted that the government did not provide any 
evidence that it could not afford to extend benefits to those over 65.21 In 
short, although the case does not yield a specific dollar figure for the cost 
of rights recognition, it seems fair to assume that it was not an amount 
that the federal government thought would sway the Court. Moreover, 
recognizing rights in Tétreault-Gadoury did not involve an ongoing 
liability for the government, and, in fact, is portrayed as a way to avoid 
such a liability by assisting claimants in reintegrating into the labour 
market rather than steering them toward government-funded pension 
benefits.22 As such, Tétreault-Gadoury, the first in this line of cases, is 
completely in step with the neo-liberal political winds that, by 1991, 
were beginning to gather force across the political spectrum. In the 
                                                                                                             
17 [2003] S.C.J. No. 54, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 504 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Martin”]. 
18 [2007] S.C.J. No. 10, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 429 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hislop”]. 
19 S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 48, s. 31(1). Persons over 65 were provided a lump sum payment in 
lieu of full benefits, if they met other criteria. The lump sum was equal to three weeks of benefits. 
See s. 31(2). 
20 Tétreault-Gadoury, supra, note 14, at 40-41, per La Forest J. for the Court, quoting La-
combe J., [1989] F.C.J. No. 818, [1989] 2 F.C. 245, at 268 (F.C.A.). 
21 Tétreault-Gadoury, id., at 46. 
22 Id. 
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Tétreault-Gadoury judgment, the unemployment insurance regime is 
aligned on the side of private, market-based solutions — namely, paid 
employment — to well-being, while regimes aimed at support for the 
elderly are aligned on the side of public, state-funded welfare responses 
to individual social security needs. 
Schachter is the second in our line of successful cases as well as a 
foundational case on remedies. It established that, under section 52(1) of 
the Constitution Act 1982, courts have considerable remedial flexibility. 
As the majority stated, “[d]epending upon the circumstances, a court may 
simply strike down, it may strike down and temporarily suspend the 
declaration of invalidity, or it may resort to the techniques of reading 
down or reading in.”23 At stake was the entitlement of new biological 
parents to the same parental benefits accorded new adoptive parents 
under the federal employment insurance scheme. The scheme provided 
for maternity benefits for biological mothers and parental benefits for 
adoptive fathers and mothers.24 Hence, biological fathers like the 
claimant, Shalom Schachter, were ineligible for any benefits, and the 
case was frequently referred to as a “fathers’ benefit” case. Shalom 
Schachter’s equality challenge was successful at the Federal Court Trial 
Division and at the Federal Court of Appeal. Leave was then granted to 
the Supreme Court of Canada. 
The main focus of argument at the Court was on the issue of what 
sort of remedy to grant in the face of the federal government’s concession 
that the exclusion of biological fathers from any kind of parental benefit 
violated equality rights and could not be justified under section 1.25 The 
Court considered as well how the costs to government of various 
remedial options should be factored into the analysis of appropriate 
remedy. In advance of the trial decision, the press had reported that the 
cost to the federal government of extending benefits to biological fathers 
would be around $500 million per year.26 In the context of other cases in 
my cohort that deal with impacts on the federal budget, this is a serious 
impact and would certainly put this case in the group of “expensive 
                                                                                                             
23 Schachter, supra, note 15, at 695, per Lamer C.J.C. for the majority. 
24 Unemployment Insurance Act, 1971, supra, note 19, s. 32. 
25 Chief Justice Lamer, for the majority, was dissatisfied with the government’s concession 
on the s. 15 issue and with their failure to attempt a s. 1 justification at trial. He noted that the Court 
was thereby deprived of the opportunity to assess the merits of the s. 15 issue and of access to the 
sort of evidence generated by s. 1. Schachter, supra, note 15, at 695. 
26 Ken MacQueen, “Father’s paternity-leave court fight could cost govt. millions in bene-
fits”, Ottawa Citizen [Final Edition] (August 19, 1987) A16. 
(2012), 58 S.C.L.R. (2d) MONEY AND THE LIMITS ON DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 307 
rights claims”.27 However, in between the Supreme Court’s granting of 
leave and its hearing, the federal government resolved the “inequality” 
problem and avoided much of the budgetary impact of rights recognition 
by equalizing down, i.e., by making biological fathers eligible but at the 
same time cutting back the entitlement for all parental benefits.28 
The legislative revision of the regime in the middle of the Schachter 
litigation offers two ways of thinking about the result in Schachter, both 
of which are consistent with the larger “follow the money” pattern. By 
the time the Supreme Court of Canada heard the case, a legislative 
resolution had been found that rendered a finding in favour of the 
equality claimant “costless”, in rough terms, from the perspective of the 
public purse. Hence, this case is one in which rights recognition is not 
simply “inexpensive” but in which the Court knows the budgetary 
impacts are either effectively nil or have already been absorbed. How-
ever, the majority reasons by Lamer C.J.C. nevertheless explored the 
factors that should be weighed in remedying under-inclusive legislation 
in Schachter type circumstances. Chief Justice Lamer found that the 
appropriate remedy would have been to declare invalid the provision 
providing parental benefits for new adoptive fathers and mothers and, at 
the same time, to suspend the declaration in order to give Parliament 
time to consider the option of preserving the benefit while correcting the 
inequality problem. In other words, the majority would have decided to 
get rid of the benefit altogether rather than add the excluded group by 
“reading in”.29 The suspension held out the hope, but not the promise, of 
some sort of reconfigured benefit. A key circumstance for the majority 
was the fact that the size of the excluded group, biological fathers, was 
much larger than the size of the included group, adoptive parents, and 
that, therefore, the “financial shake up” for the federal budget that would 
                                                                                                             
27 See the table at the end of this Part for a summary of the costs of rights recognition in 
relation to federal and provincial budgets in my cohort of cases. What counts as “serious” is of 
course a key question in my study. I have generally taken the Court’s word for it. If the judgments 
are treating an impact as serious, I am more interested in simply noting what amount is being treated 
as serious rather than challenging that assessment. However, in the conclusion, I do comment on 
some of the inconsistencies in how the Court measures the seriousness of a budgetary impact. See 
discussion infra, between notes 129 and 130. 
28 The amendments made parental benefits available for all new parents, biological and 
adoptive, but reduced the entitlement from 15 to 10 weeks of benefits: Act to amend the Unemploy-
ment Insurance Act and the Employment and Immigration Department and Commission Act, S.C. 
1990, c. 40. 
29 The concurring reasons by La Forest J., writing for himself and L’Heureux-Dubé J., were 
in general agreement with Lamer C.J.C.’s approach. 
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be caused by the Court “reading in” would be considerable.30 In short, 
Schachter, at least theoretically, is a case in which a rights recognition 
claim that had a serious budgetary impact was successful; however, the 
remedy that would have been granted would have actually “saved” 
Parliament money because it solved the equality problem by getting rid 
of the benefit altogether — a rather hollow victory from a distributive 
justice perspective. Indeed, on this analysis, it might make more sense to 
treat Schachter as a case in which an expensive claim was lost, and in 
which both the included and excluded group were left at risk of having 
no benefit at all. Because of the intervening action by Parliament in the 
form of equalizing down, the actual outcome was to maintain, roughly 
speaking, the budgetary status quo. 
The larger public/private dimension of Schachter is equally complex. 
In contrast to the unemployment benefits in Tétreault-Gadoury, state-
funded parental benefits are aligned with public responsibility for social 
reproduction in contradistinction to private, familial responsibility. 
However, the location of the benefit program in an employment insur-
ance regime ties the benefit, as in Tétreault-Gadoury, to a vision that 
gives primacy to market-based responses to social security that, in turn, 
ultimately place responsibility on the shoulders of individuals. In short, 
being a parent is not enough; you have to have engaged in the requisite 
amount of paid employment in order to qualify for the benefit. The cross-
cutting factor of gender further complicates the public/private dynamic, 
as social patterns of engagement in the unpaid work of social reproduc-
tion were and are deeply gendered. To the extent that public supports fall 
short of fully addressing the work of social reproduction, that work tends 
to be taken up by women. Parliament’s gender-neutral “equalize down” 
solution is viewed in the feminist commentary as an approach that, in the 
end, undermined the amount of support for primary caregivers, the bulk 
of whom are women.31 Also, the majority’s implicit preference for a 
“strike and suspend” remedy in the context of under-inclusive legislation 
has been criticized for “increas[ing] the vulnerability of groups which 
currently receive social benefits”.32 
                                                                                                             
30 Schachter, supra, note 15, at 723. 
31 Nitya Iyer, “Some Mothers are Better than Others: A Re-examination of Maternity Bene-
fits” in Susan B. Boyd, ed., Challenging the Public/Private Divide: Feminism, Law, and Public 
Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997) 168, at 182-84. 
32 Nitya Duclos (now Iyer), “A Remedy for the Nineties” (1992) 4 Const. Forum Const. 22, 
at 23. 
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Next comes Eldridge, a case in the mid-1990s in which hearing-
impaired patients at Vancouver General Hospital successfully challenged 
the failure of the hospital to provide them with sign-language translators 
for their interactions with medical personnel. The cost of doing so was 
estimated at $150,000 per year.33 After finding that section 15 had been 
violated, La Forest J., writing for a unanimous Court, turned to the 
section 1 stage of analysis. Here he assumed without deciding that the 
objective of “controlling health expenditures” qualified as a substantial 
and pressing objective to which the decision regarding sign-language 
translation costs of the hospital’s committee was rationally connected.34 
However, he found that the decision was not minimally impairing. The 
insignificance of the cost to government played a crucial role in La 
Forest J.’s analysis. He characterized the amount as “approximately 
0.0025 percent of the provincial health care budget” and “a relatively 
insignificant sum”.35 The refusal to spend such an amount, he concluded, 
“cannot possibly constitute a minimal impairment of the appellants’ 
constitutional rights”.36 
The next case, Martin, occurred in the early 2000s. It concerned a 
successful equality challenge to provisions in the Nova Scotia workers’ 
compensation regime that excluded chronic pain claims from coverage 
under the regular part of the regime and, instead, provided much more 
limited compensation for successful claimants.37 The question of budget-
ary impacts came up, as in Eldridge, at the section 1 stage. Justice 
Gonthier, writing for a unanimous Court, dealt with them in relation to 
the “substantial and compelling objective” prong of analysis. He tiptoed 
around the question of whether “controlling expenditures” could in fact 
serve as a substantial and compelling objective, instead dismissing the 
government’s argument in this regard for lack of evidence. He observed: 
Nothing in the evidence establishes that the chronic pain claims in and 
of themselves placed sufficient strain upon the Accident Fund to 
threaten its viability, or that such claims significantly contributed to its 
present unfunded liability.38 
                                                                                                             
33 Eldridge, supra, note 16, at para. 4. 
34 Id., at para. 84. 
35 Id., at para. 87. 
36 Id. 
37 Workers’ Compensation Act, S.N.S. 1994-95, c. 10, s. 10B – Functional Restoration 
(Multi-Faceted Pain Services) Program Regulations, N.S. Reg. 57/96. 
38 Martin, supra, note 17, at para. 109. 
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This suggests that, as in Tétreault-Gadoury, the economic impact on 
government of including chronic pain sufferers in full coverage was not 
significant enough to be explicitly advanced as a factor justifying under-
inclusion.39 
Hislop, in 2007, is the last in the line of successful claims. It was a 
class action that challenged the limits placed on the retroactivity of 
survivor benefits for same-sex spouses under the Canada Pension Plan.40 
The provisions in question had been enacted to rectify the exclusion of 
same-sex spouses from the scheme, in the wake of the Court’s 1999 
decision in M. v. H.41 The latter case is a key private benefit case in 
which a same-sex challenge to exclusion from access to the spousal 
support provisions in family law legislation was found to violate equality 
in a manner that could not be justified under section 1.42 In Hislop, as in 
Tétreault-Gadoury, the retroactive reach of the amendments with respect 
to eligibility for benefits (triggered by the death of the contributor 
spouse) stopped significantly short of April 17, 1985, the date when 
section 15 became effective.43 Moreover, the statute contained a provi-
sion that limited all claimants to 12 months of retroactive compensation 
calculated from the date at which an application for benefits was made.44 
However, the remedial amendments denied same-sex survivors the 
benefit of the 12 months of arrears if they applied after July 2000.45 More 
fundamentally, the amendments failed to recognize the unfairness of the 
“only 12 months of arrears” rule in relation to the members of the Hislop 
class who had no opportunity to apply for benefits in a timely manner 
because of their unconstitutional exclusion from the regime during the 
years before the M. v. H. decision.46 The majority at the Supreme Court 
                                                                                                             
39 Id., at para. 109. Justice Gonthier went on to consider government arguments based on 
three other objectives: developing a consistent legislative response, avoiding fraudulent claims, and 
implementing early medical intervention and return to work as the treatment for chronic pain. All 
were dismissed. The first failed the substantial and compelling objective test and the other two the 
minimal impairment test. Id., at paras. 110 to 117. 
40 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-8 [hereinafter “CPP”]. 
41 M. v. H., [1999] S.C.J. No. 23, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.). 
42 Id. A majority, in reasons by Cory and Iacobucci JJ., found that the exclusion of same-
sex spouses from the family law regime was a violation of equality rights that could not be justified 
under s. 1. Justice Major and Bastarache J. each wrote separate reasons concurring in the result. 
Justice Gonthier dissented. 
43 Eligibility for survivor benefits was limited to those whose spouse died on or after Janu-
ary 1, 1998. See s. 44(1.1) [ad. 2000, c. 12, s. 44(3)] of the CPP. 
44 CPP, s. 72(1). 
45 Id., s. 72(2) [ad. 2000, c. 12, s. 54]. 
46 In addition, section 60(2) of the CPP limited the right of estates of survivors to apply for 
benefits to a 12-month time period after the survivor’s death. The Hislop class argued that the Court 
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of Canada found that eligibility for benefits should be extended to any 
same-sex survivor whose spouse died after April 17, 1985, and that all 
same-sex survivors should be provided with the benefit of 12 months of 
arrears, but that there was no adverse impact on equality rights stemming 
from the 12-month restriction. 
The Hislop majority was willing to take account of budgetary im-
pacts in the course of the section 1 proportionality analysis,47 but noted 
that the federal government had not provided sufficient evidence of those 
impacts.48 Indeed, the Crown conceded at trial that a successful claim by 
the litigants would “not have a significant impact on the solvency of the 
CPP”.49 Thus, the federal government’s section 1 arguments failed with 
respect to the retroactive reach of the provisions regarding eligibility and 
entitlement to 12 months of arrears. The challenge to the application of 
the general restriction on arrears to the Hislop class was treated by the 
majority as an argument about remedy. As such, the majority found that 
the financial nature of the remedy was a legitimate factor to consider, 
among others, given the overarching principle of the separate constitu-
tional roles of courts and legislatures with respect to “the allocation of 
public resources”.50 Accordingly, the majority denied the arrears part of 
the claim on the “separation of powers” basis, namely, that courts should 
defer to legislative decisions to place general limits, in this manner, on 
eligibility for financial benefits. 
Because the financial impact argument was not pursued by the fed-
eral government, it is hard to calculate what the actual cost of rights 
recognition was in Hislop. Print media reported an array of possible 
impacts ranging from $22 million51 to $400 million.52 R. Douglas Elliott, 
                                                                                                             
should suspend s. 60(2) to the extent necessary to allow estates of members of the Hislop class to 
claim benefits as if they had been recognized as survivors at the date of the deceased contributor. 
The Hislop majority rejected this aspect of the claim, finding that estates do not have Charter rights. 
Hislop, supra, note 18, at para. 73. An exception was made for Mr. Hislop, however. Although Mr. 
Hislop died in between the notice of appeal to the Court and the hearing, his estate was able to get 
the full benefit of the Court’s decision because he had been alive when a judgment in the case was 
first obtained. Indeed, the estate of any class member who died after the conclusion of argument at 
trial in the Ontario Superior Court was entitled to benefit from the ultimate decision of the Supreme 
Court of Canada. Id., at paras. 74-77. 
47 Id., at para. 64. 
48 Id., at para. 65. 
49 Hislop v. Canada (Attorney General), [2003] O.J. No. 5212, 234 D.L.R. (4th) 465, at 
para. 116 (Ont. S.C.J.). 
50 Hislop, supra, note 18, at para. 100.  
51 Tracey Tyler, “Same-sex survivor benefits challenged: Effective date is 1998, not ’85. 
Ottawa argues First anniversary of gay ruling” Toronto Star (June 11, 2004) A21. 
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counsel for the class of Hislop claimants, has extrapolated from the 
actuarial evidence on the cost of the claim, estimated at $50 million, 
provided at trial by a Crown witness to arrive at a rough estimate of the 
actual cost to federal coffers of the partial victory for the Hislop class. 
After the reduction of the class by deaths and taking account of the fact 
that the Court upheld the 12-month restriction on arrears, he calculates 
that the federal government was obliged to pay out approximately $25 to 
$30 million in benefits in the wake of the decision.53 In terms of justice 
trumping “money”, this case is the high-water mark. 
The cost of the successful claims can be summarized as follows: 
Table 1 
Case Amount Government Regime 
Tétreault-
Gadoury 
1991 
no figure provided, 
less expensive than denial of 
claim 
Federal employment 
insurance 
Schachter
1992 
Actually, $0 
Theoretically, $500 million and 
described as a “financial shake 
up”. Avoided by choosing 
remedy that eliminates benefit 
altogether thereby reducing 
budgetary liability. 
Federal employment 
insurance 
Eldridge 
1997 
$150,000 per annum 
0.0025% of health care budget 
British 
Columbia 
health care 
Martin 
2003 
no figure provided, 
evidence of budgetary impact 
unconvincing 
Nova Scotia workers’ 
compensation 
Hislop 
2007 
Entire claim $50 million 
Successful part of claim $25 to 
$30 million 
Crown conceded budgetary im-
pact of $50 million insignificant
Federal pensions 
(CPP) 
                                                                                                             
52 Allan Woods, “Court extends same-sex benefits: Ont. ruling on CPP death benefits” 
Edmonton Journal (December 20, 2003) A8. 
53 Conversation with R. Douglas Elliott at “Constitutional Cases” workshop, May 2012, and 
further email correspondence June 8, 2012, on file with author.  
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When charted in this way, it is clear that equality litigants have been 
successful in the social benefit cases only when the cost of rights 
recognition is small or can be in some way minimized by the Court. I 
should stress that the link between the cost of rights and the success or 
failure of a claim is a correlation only. Typically, there are multiple 
reasons why an equality claim succeeds so that the fact that the cost of 
rights recognition is seen to be manageable is, at best, only one factor in 
many. However, the overall pattern in wins and losses would seem to 
indicate that it is a very important element. 
2. Cases in which the Claim Was Unsuccessful 
The unsuccessful cases in my selected cohort are: Egan v. Canada,54 
Eaton v. Brant (County) Board of Education,55 Law v. Canada (Minister 
of Employment and Immigration),56 Gosselin v. Québec (Attorney Gen-
eral),57 Hodge v. Canada (Minister of Human Resources Development),58 
NAPE,59 Auton (Guardian ad litem of) v. British Columbia (Attorney 
General)60 and Withler v. Canada (Attorney General).61 In these eight 
cases, there are some in which the costs to government of a victory 
would have been staggering, and others in which the cost to government 
would have been within the range of some of the successful claims 
discussed above. In many of the cases, budgetary impacts play a promi-
nent role in the decision; in a few, they appear to play no role at all. 
We begin with three cases in the 1990s: Egan, Eaton and Law. Egan 
concerned an equality challenge by same-sex spouses to the heterosexual 
definition of spouse in the Old Age Security Act.62 Five judges found that 
the exclusion violated section 15 and four of them went on to find that it 
was an unjustifiable exclusion under section 1. The fifth, Sopinka J., 
disagreed with the section 1 analysis of this group primarily because of 
the “novel” nature of the claim63 and the budgetary line-drawing and 
                                                                                                             
54 [1995] S.C.J. No. 43, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Egan”]. 
55 [1996] S.C.J. No. 98, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 241 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Eaton”]. 
56 [1999] S.C.J. No. 12, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Law”]. 
57 [2002] S.C.J. No. 85, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Gosselin”]. 
58 [2004] S.C.J. No. 60, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 357 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hodge”]. 
59 Supra, note 1. 
60 [2004] S.C.J. No. 41, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 657 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Auton”]. 
61 [2011] S.C.J. No. 12, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 396 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Withler”]. 
62 R.S.C. 1985, c. O-9 [hereinafter “OAS”]. 
63 Egan, supra, note 54, at para. 111. 
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trade-offs involved in the design of social benefit regimes.64 His judg-
ment, combined with that of four judges who refused to find an equality 
violation, resulted in the denial of the claim. The cost of rights recogni-
tion to the federal government was estimated at between $12 million and 
$37 million per annum, or between two and four per cent of the OAS 
program’s costs.65 The amount was challenged at trial and an argument 
made that the government figures were inflated.66 Two of the judges at 
the Supreme Court characterized the evidence of budgetary impacts as 
“highly speculative and statistically weak”.67 The calculation of budget-
ary impact in Egan is based not on the cost of remedying the harm to the 
specific claimants but on attempts to predict what the government’s 
annual liability going forward would be if same sex-spouses were 
included in the regime. 
The Eaton and Law judgments offer much less direct engagement 
with the issue of budgetary impacts. Eaton focused on the decision by 
provincial educational authorities to transfer Emily Eaton, a severely 
disabled child, from her placement in an integrated regular classroom at 
her neighbourhood elementary school to a special classroom at a school 
outside her neighbourhood. Although there are no doubt different cost 
implications for the provincial school system in relation to these two 
kinds of placements, budgetary impacts do not feature in the judicial 
analysis. I was unable to find an estimate in the decisions below or in the 
media regarding the public cost of recognizing Eaton’s claim. The key 
issue dividing judicial decision-makers was whether the transfer out of 
an integrated and into a segregated setting on the grounds of Emily’s 
“best interests” constituted a violation of section 15. Only Arbour J.A., 
writing for a unanimous Court of Appeal, thought so and would have 
sent the case back for a rehearing, at which point expense considerations 
might have become more prominent.68 A unanimous Supreme Court of 
Canada overturned her decision, finding that there is no Charter-derived 
presumption of integration into mainstream institutions in a situation 
such as that of Emily Eaton, and that the decision to place her in a 
                                                                                                             
64 Id., at paras. 108-110. 
65 Id., at para. 99, per L’Heureux-Dubé J., dissenting. 
66 Id. 
67 Id., at para. 193, per Cory and Iacobucci JJ., dissenting on the s. 1 issue, in reasons writ-
ten by Iacobucci J. 
68 Eaton v. Brant (County) Board of Education, [1995] O.J. No. 315, 22 O.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. 
C.A.). 
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segregated setting neither imposed “a burden or disadvantage” nor 
constituted “the withholding of a benefit or advantage”.69 
The next case is Law in 1999. Here the challenge was to an age cut-
off in the CPP with respect to spousal survivor benefits.70 It was reported 
in the media that court documents estimated it would cost $80 million by 
2000 to extend benefits to all survivors.71 A unanimous judgment by the 
Supreme Court of Canada found that there was no equality violation. 
Again, as in Eaton, government concerns about budgetary impacts did 
not feature in the Court’s analysis. 
As we enter the 2000s, the list of failed challenges continues to grow. 
Gosselin in 2002 concerns a claim that, of all the cases in my selected 
cohort, carries the highest price tag for a provincial government. The 
budgetary impact of the challenge to an age-based barrier to full social 
assistance benefits under Quebec legislation was quantified at $389 
million plus interest accrued since 1985.72 A majority at the Supreme 
Court of Canada, in a deeply divided decision, rejected Gosselin’s claim 
on both section 15 and section 7 grounds. Gosselin heralds a much more 
explicit embrace of neo-liberal values. The contrast with Tétreault-
Gadoury, roughly 10 years earlier, is instructive. In the latter case, the 
Court finds that Marcelle Tétreault-Gadoury should not be steered, on the 
basis of age, toward long-term dependency on an income assistance 
program by the denial of access to a program aimed at facilitating re-
entry into the labour force. Here, conventional understandings of the 
liberal values of choice and equality are preserved unchanged and 
converge with the primacy given to market solutions by neo-liberalism. 
Tétreault-Gadoury’s right to choose the path leading to reintegration into 
the workforce is vindicated. In Gosselin, an age-based distinction 
deployed to deny access to social assistance, in order to steer youth into 
workfare programs, is applauded as facilitative rather than undermining 
of human dignity. Conventional understandings of choice and equality 
would seem to be at odds with the coercive aspects of the regime, which 
makes use of the economic desperation of income assistance clients to 
obtain the desired result. However, referring to the Quebec program, 
McLachlin C.J.C. observed: 
                                                                                                             
69 Eaton, supra, note 55, at paras. 79-81, per Sopinka J. for eight of nine judges. The ninth 
judge, Lamer C.J.C., agreed in separate reasons. 
70 CPP, ss. 44(1)(d) and 58. 
71 Janice Tibbetts, “The Federal pension plan’s survivor benefit rules not discriminatory” 
Ottawa Citizen [final edition] (March 26, 1999) A4. 
72 Gosselin, supra, note 57, at para. 4, per McLachlin C.J.C. for the majority. 
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The participation incentive worked towards the realization of the goals 
that go to the heart of the equality guarantee: self-determination, 
personal autonomy, self-respect, feelings of self-worth, and empowerment. 
These are the stuff and substance of essential human dignity.73 
In short, in Gosselin the liberal values of choice and equality are 
not simply trumped or ignored, but rather rewritten so that they appear 
to converge, as in Tétreault-Gadoury, with neo-liberal conceptions of 
individual and social well-being. This remarkable normative shift in the 
content of core liberal ideals occurs relatively invisibly under cover of 
the flexible language of human dignity.74 
Next come three cases decided in 2004: Hodge, NAPE and Auton. In 
Hodge the budgetary impact of the issue is treated as insignificant; in 
NAPE and Auton, budgetary impact is very much on the minds of the 
judges. Hodge focused on eligibility for survivor benefits for common 
law spouses under the CPP.75 The Supreme Court of Canada judgment 
does not address financial impacts on government as a factor. However, 
the Federal Court of Appeal decision did note that the federal govern-
ment had not provided any clear evidence in that regard.76 This suggests 
that the amount was not sufficiently large to support such an argument.77 
A comparison with Hislop reinforces this inference, as both involve a 
subset of common law spouses and the CPP. Hodge involves survivors 
who had been separated from their spouses but continued to experience 
the effects of financial interdependencies and Hislop involves survivors 
who had been in intact same-sex spousal relationships.78 
                                                                                                             
73 Id., at para. 65, per McLachlin C.J.C. for the majority. 
74 Note that the doctrinal role of human dignity has since been much reduced, although the 
normative shift in terms of what should count as an equality harm and what should count as equality-
enhancing remains firmly embedded in the jurisprudence. See R. v. Kapp, [2008] S.C.J. No. 42, 
[2008] 2 S.C.R. 483 at paras. 21 and 22 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Kapp”], lamenting the doctrinal 
missteps facilitated by the language of human dignity. See Margot Young, “Unequal to the Task; 
‘Kapp’ing the Substantive Potential of Section 15” in S. Rodgers and S. McIntyre, eds. (2010) 50 
S.C.L.R. (2d) 183 for an analysis of the way in which Kapp reinforces neo-liberal justice at the 
expense of social justice. 
75 CPP, s. 2(1) “spouse” [ad. c. 30 (2nd Supp., s. 1(3)] and s. 44(1)(d). 
76 Hodge v. Canada (Minister of Human Resources Development), [2003] F.C.J. No. 900, 
[2003] 1 F.C. 271, at para. 52 (F.C.A.), per Malone J.A., Evans and Linden JJ.A. concurring. 
77 Exactly how large is sufficiently large is of course unclear. However, for my purpose of 
determining how the Court perceives different amounts, comparison with other cases offers the best 
guidance. 
78 To clarify, while the group of survivors of all common law relationships is of course 
much larger than the group of survivors of same-sex common law relationships, note that Hodge 
dealt with the subset of survivor spouses who had separated from the contributor spouse shortly 
before the death of the contributor. 
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NAPE, the second case in the 2004 cohort, notoriously pivoted on the 
budgetary impact argument.79 The equality challenge was to the cancella-
tion by the Newfoundland and Labrador government, on the basis of an 
alleged financial crisis, of an agreement to pay three years of pay equity 
arrears to female hospital workers. The amount was $24 million.80 The 
Court, in unanimous reasons by Binnie J., accepted the government’s 
argument that a financial emergency existed of sufficient proportions to 
justify, in accordance with section 1, the infringement of equality rights. 
Finally, in Auton, the challenge was aimed at the failure of the Medicare 
regime in British Columbia to cover the costs of an autism therapy. The 
cost to the province was estimated at between $45,000 and $60,000 per 
annum per autistic child between the ages of three and six, and was 
described as expensive.81 Although the claimants succeeded at trial and 
appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada, in a unanimous decision by 
McLachlin C.J.C., found that there was no infraction of equality rights. 
The last case is Withler in 2011. Here the challenge was to age based 
limits on the eligibility of survivor spouses for death benefits under two 
federal pension schemes.82 The federal factum asserted that the cost of 
rights recognition would be financially prohibitive.83 Press reports put 
costs at $2.3 billion if retroactive payments were ordered.84 The Court, in 
joint reasons by McLachlin C.J.C. and Abella J., found that equality 
rights had not been violated by the under-inclusiveness in the two 
regimes. This case bears the highest price tag for rights recognition for 
any government — provincial or federal — of all the cases considered. 
The financial impact of the eight losing cases is summarized as 
follows: 
                                                                                                             
79 For critiques of the budgetary analysis at the heart of the decision in NAPE, supra, note 1, 
see Robin L. Reinerston, “Discrimination and Difference: A Comment on Newfoundland (Treasury 
Board) v. N.A.P.E. (2004) 3(1) J.L. & Equality 227; Jennifer Koshan, “Newfoundland (Treasury 
Board) v. N.A.P.E.” (2006) 18 C.J.W.L. 327 [hereinafter “Koshan”]; and Judy Fudge, “Substantive 
Equality, the Supreme Court of Canada, and the Limits to Redistribution” (2007) 23 S.A.J.H.R. 235. 
80 NAPE, id., at para. 6, per Binnie J. for the Court. 
81 Auton, supra, note 60, at para. 5, per McLachlin C.J.C. for the Court. 
82 Canadian Forces Superannuation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-17; Public Service Superannua-
tion Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-36. 
83 As quoted in Jennifer Koshan & Jonnette Watson Hamilton, “Meaningless Mantra: Subs-
tantive Equality after Withler” (2011) 16 Rev. Const. Stud. 31, at 55 [hereinafter “Koshan & 
Hamilton”]. 
84 Amy Minsky, “Widows lose appeal for death benefits; No age discrimination in govern-
ment policy” Ottawa Citizen (March 5, 2011) A3. 
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Table 2 
Case Amount Government Regime 
Egan $12 to $37 million 
or 2-4% of program 
budget at most 
Federal pensions (OAS) 
Eaton no figure provided Provincial special  
education 
Law $80 million Federal pensions (CPP) 
Gosselin $389 million plus 17 
years of accrued interest 
Provincial social assistance 
Hodge no figure provided, 
described as 
insignificant 
Federal pensions (CPP) 
NAPE $24 million Provincial pay equity 
agreement 
Auton no figure provided, 
described as expensive 
Provincial health care 
Withler $2.3 billion Federal pensions 
 
Again, the charting of wins and losses in this simple manner both 
clarifies and obscures. The table shows only correlations, not firm causal 
links. This is perhaps more obvious here than in the first table, as the 
amounts at stake for government vary wildly. As with the first table, this 
second table leaves out all the factors, other than budgetary impact, that 
might have influenced the Court’s resolution of each of these cases. Even 
NAPE, which of all the 13 cases in my selected cohort is most clearly 
about budgetary impact, cannot be explained entirely in those terms. 
Nevertheless, the pattern presented is stark enough to support some 
important inferences. Because of the variation in amounts at stake, the 
second table is best read in combination with the first table. Together 
they suggest that a minimal budgetary impact is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for a successful social benefit challenge under section 
15, while a serious budgetary impact poses a serious, if not impossible, 
hurdle. 
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III. WHAT HAS THE SUPREME COURT SAID?  
FACTORING BUDGETARY IMPACT INTO THE CHARTER  
FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS 
The Supreme Court of Canada’s response to the question of what 
role budgetary impacts should play in rights adjudication has evolved 
over the years from a position of high principle — money and adminis-
trative convenience should never trump justice — to a position where 
such concerns can be considered at virtually every step of the analysis, 
particularly in equality claims. The starting point for any discussion of 
the tension between money and justice is Singh v. Canada (Minister of 
Employment and Immigration),85 one of the first Supreme Court of 
Canada Charter cases, in which claimants argued that the procedures 
under federal legislation for redetermining the denial of refugee status 
violated section 7 of the Charter and section 2(e) of the Canadian Bill of 
Rights.86 The Court was unanimous in finding for the claimants but 
evenly split between three judges who relied on the Charter and three 
who relied on the Bill of Rights.87 In relation to the section 1 Charter 
argument, the federal government submitted that to require an oral 
hearing before the Immigration Appeal Board “would constitute an 
unreasonable burden on the Board’s resources”.88 Justice Wilson, writing 
for the three judges who founded their decision on the Charter, referred 
to the federal government’s arguments as a “type of utilitarian considera-
tion” and asserted: 
No doubt considerable time and money can be saved by adopting 
administrative procedures which ignore the principles of fundamental 
justice but such an argument, in my view, misses the point of the 
exercise under s. 1. The principles of natural justice and procedural 
fairness which have long been espoused by our courts, and the 
constitutional entrenchment of the principles of fundamental justice in 
s. 7, implicitly recognize that a balance of administrative convenience 
does not override the need to adhere to these principles.89 
The Singh decision required the creation of an adjudicative structure 
for determining refugee claims, a result that was extremely expensive for 
                                                                                                             
85 Supra, note 7. 
86 S.C. 1960, c. 44 [hereinafter “Bill of Rights”]. 
87 Justice Ritchie was one of the seven judges on the panel at the hearing but did not take 
part in the decision. 
88 Singh, supra, note 7, at para. 68.  
89 Id., at para. 70. 
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the federal government. Singh thus pushed the issue of the cost of rights 
recognition into the foreground. Using the equality cases discussed so far 
as the unifying theme, I have organized an overview of the evolution of 
the Court’s position, in the wake of Singh, on how to resolve the tension 
between money and justice into four chronological stages represented by 
four emblematic cases: Schachter, Egan, NAPE and Withler. As men-
tioned in the introduction, much of the discussion in the jurisprudence 
focuses on which of the three main steps in the Charter framework — the 
rights analysis, the section 1 limitation analysis (and its sub-parts), and/or 
the remedy stage — should be the main location for factoring in the 
budgetary impact on governments of rights recognition in any particular 
case. 
1. Schachter and the “Substantial and Compelling Objective” 
Analysis 
Justice Wilson’s 1985 assurance that constitutional principle should 
prevail over administrative convenience became in 1992, in Schachter, 
the narrower rule that budgetary considerations cannot serve as a 
substantial and compelling objective that justifies limits on rights under 
section 1 of the Charter. The Schachter case also clarified that financial 
impacts should be an element of the analysis of remedy. In the context of 
a discussion of the importance of taking account of legislative objectives 
in fashioning remedies, Lamer C.J.C. for the majority stated: 
This Court has held, and rightly so, that budgetary considerations 
cannot be used to justify a violation under s. 1. However, such 
considerations are clearly relevant once a violation which does not 
survive s. 1 has been established, s. 52 is determined to have been 
engaged and the Court turns its attention to what action should be taken 
thereunder. 90 
Chief Justice Lamer then went on to set out the framework for crafting 
remedial orders under the Charter in a way that included a direct consid-
eration of the budgetary impact on government.91 
The Schachter majority’s embrace of budgetary impacts as a key fac-
tor at the remedy stage makes sense when placed in the context of the 
overall design of Charter argument. On closer reading, Wilson J.’s 
“principle trumps utility” sentiment was only ever meant to be a starting 
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point for the eventual elaboration of a more nuanced approach.92 To 
confine this elaboration to the remedy analysis in the overall framework 
of Charter adjudication would seem to be very faithful to the spirit of 
Wilson J.’s assertion. It ensures that full play will be given to questions 
of whether rights have been violated and, if so, whether there are non-
utilitarian considerations that can justify the violation. Schachter, 
however, does not go this far. Rather, consideration of budgetary impacts 
is ruled out at the first step of the section 1 inquiry into government 
objectives, and then treated as highly relevant at what, in most successful 
Charter claims, is the very last “remedy” step. Of course, as discussed 
earlier, the remedy question was the only one left open by the time the 
case reached the Supreme Court of Canada. The key doctrinal issue left 
unanswered by Schachter is whether there are places in the section 1 
analysis, other than the substantial and compelling objective inquiry, 
where budgetary impacts can play a role. 
2. Egan and Judicial Deference in the Proportionality Analysis 
That question is quickly taken up in subsequent cases. Three of these 
cases (McKinney v. University of Guelph,93 Egan and Irwin Toy Ltd. v. 
Québec (Attorney General))94 are cited in support of the proposition, 
presented as such in 1997 in Reference re Provincial Court Judges, that 
financial concerns can be a legitimate consideration in the minimal 
impairment analysis so long as such concerns are not the objective of the 
legislation.95 As Lamer C.J.C. stated in the latter case: “While purely 
financial considerations are not sufficient to justify the infringement of 
Charter rights, they are relevant to determining the standard of deference 
for the test of minimal impairment when reviewing legislation which is 
enacted for a purpose which is not financial.”96 The moral high ground 
thus becomes maintaining the clear bright line, emphasized by Lamer 
                                                                                                             
92 Justice Wilson alludes to this in the final sentence of the above quotation: “Whatever 
standard of review eventually emerges under s. 1, it seems to me that the basis of the justification for 
the limitation of rights under s. 7 must be more compelling than any advanced in these appeals”: 
Singh, supra, note 7, at para. 70. Justice Binnie in NAPE also reads Wilson J.’s statement in less 
absolute terms: NAPE, supra, note 1, at para. 67. 
93 [1990] S.C.J. No. 122, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 229 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “McKinney”]. 
94 [1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Irwin Toy”]. 
95 [1997] S.C.J. No. 75, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3, at para. 283 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Provincial 
Judges Reference”]. Note that of these four cases, only Egan concerns an equality challenge that 
involves the distribution of scarce financial resources. Hence, like Singh, these cases were left out of 
my survey in Part I. 
96 Id. (emphasis in original). 
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C.J.C.’s literal underlining, drawn around the substantial and compelling 
objective analysis by the rule in Schachter. 
The conundrum of what stance courts should take when recognition 
of Charter rights has high financial costs for governments presents itself 
in these early years as a subset of the much broader issue concerning 
how courts should weigh governmental choices regarding the distribution 
of all manner of scarce resources as well as regarding the trade-offs 
between competing demands and interests. Of the three cases cited in 
support of the Provincial Judges Reference proposition, only Egan is a 
case in which there are implications for scarce financial resources. In 
McKinney, the different interests of younger and older workers are 
balanced in a scheme that is distributing human rights protection. In 
Irwin Toy, the interests of children in being protected from manipulation 
by advertisers are prioritized over the interests of commerce and of 
freedom of expression for both children and commercial interests. 
Neither of these cases is about the kind of budgetary line-drawing that is 
so clearly front and centre in cases like Egan and Auton. The slippage 
between these two sorts of situations — one involving budgetary 
concerns and the other policy trade-offs — is important, for it allows the 
Court to gloss over their differences. This is particularly true in the 
context of Charter challenges to social benefit regimes where these two 
dimensions of much governmental decision-making are often intertwined. 
However, they are conceptually distinct and, in some contexts, concretely 
and actually distinct. Egan, the case I see as emblematic of this second 
stage in the evolution of a “dollars versus rights” jurisprudence, is 
unusual in that the slippage becomes a point of sharp disagreement 
between some of the judges. 
Recall that in Egan, Sopinka J.’s reasons, finding that the violation of 
equality rights under section 15 could be justified under section 1, made 
up the majority in combination with the reasons of four other judges 
finding that section 15 had not been violated at all. Despite his solitary 
stand in Egan on the section 1 issue, Sopinka J.’s statement in the course 
of his reasons that “it is not realistic for the Court to assume that there 
are unlimited funds to address the needs of all” came to represent a 
quickly solidifying pragmatic stance.97 The doctrinal expression of this 
pragmatism is judicial deference to legislative decisions. Justice Sopinka 
                                                                                                             
97 Egan, supra, note 54, at para. 104. See Provincial Judges Reference, supra, note 95, at 
para. 283 for examples of the citation of Sopinka J.’s s. 1 analysis for support for a deferential 
approach to the proportionality analysis where significant budgetary impacts on the “public purse” 
are at stake. 
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articulates the trigger for this deferential posture in the broadest terms 
possible, namely, in terms of a legislative policy choice: “This Court has 
recognized that it is legitimate for the government to make choices 
between disadvantaged groups and that it must be provided with some 
leeway to do so.”98 Justices Cory and Iacobucci in dissent differ quite 
sharply. For them, it is significant that the Egan challenge to the under-
inclusive OAS provisions does not, as in McKinney, involve balancing an 
array of competing interests. As Iacobucci J. put it in their joint reasons, 
“[t]he only competing interest in the case at bar is budgetary in nature.”99 
Justices Cory and Iacobucci are also much more willing to scrutinize the 
claimed budgetary impact. As noted earlier, they find the Crown’s 
financial evidence “highly speculative and statistically weak”.100 They 
also take the view that “[t]he jurisprudence of this Court reveals, as a 
general matter, a reluctance to accord much weight to financial consid-
erations under s. 1 analysis.”101 
Although these two points of dispute pale beside the profound dis-
agreements over the nature of equality and the viability of the equality 
claim that divided the Bench in Egan, they nonetheless raise significant 
issues. The first point of dispute demands that we think about the 
implications of the distinction between judicial interference in govern-
ment budgetary decisions and judicial interference in complex, polycen-
tric policy distinctions. Are different concerns at play in these two 
situations, demanding different judicial postures and inquiries? The 
second point of dispute pertains to the question of how thorough and 
convincing Crown evidence of budgetary strain should be before courts 
turn to the question of whether a deferential posture is appropriate. Even 
if we agree that courts should behave extremely deferentially where large 
financial commitments are at issue, should the precondition be subject to 
a much more rigorous scrutiny? 
3. NAPE and the Crisis Exception to the Schachter Rule 
The third significant marker in the “dollars versus rights” jurispru-
dence is the NAPE decision itself. The Schachter rule, reinforced in 
Provincial Judges Reference, that financial concerns cannot serve to 
                                                                                                             
98 Egan, id., at para. 105. 
99 Id., at para. 214. 
100 Id., at para. 193. 
101 Id., at para. 194. 
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meet the “substantial and compelling objective” requirement at section 1, 
is reopened and an exception made for situations of extreme financial 
crisis.102 This is the ratio that comes out of the NAPE case, along with 
the political lesson that women’s equality rights are altogether too easily 
trumped. 
As doctrine, the NAPE qualification of the Schachter rule is not all 
that surprising, and I would speculate that even Wilson J. would concede 
that an extreme financial emergency justifies restrictions on rights. NAPE 
is more significant in that the Court, invoking legitimacy concerns, was 
willing to accept an admittedly flimsy amount of evidence to justify the 
government’s assertion of a fiscal crisis. As Binnie J. put it, “[w]hat 
transpires in the budgetary process, of course, lies at the high end of 
Cabinet confidences... .”103 The contrast with Cory and Iacobucci JJ.’s 
demand in Egan for more convincing evidence of budgetary distress is 
disheartening.104 
The comparison of NAPE with Egan is instructive with respect to 
another aspect, that of the murkiness of the distinction between budget-
ary and social policy decisions. Although Binnie J. could have left us 
with simply the “financial emergency” story as an explanation for the 
Court’s decision, he strained to characterize governmental purposes in 
relation to the cancellation of the pay equity agreements as not simply 
cost-cutting in the face of a financial crisis but as a decision to trade off 
women’s equality against the priorities of other programs that address 
social needs such as health and education.105 Citing the Court’s 1989 
decision in R. v. Lee106 for support, Binnie J. asserts: “It was thus clear 
from an early date that financial considerations wrapped up with other 
public policy considerations could qualify as sufficiently important 
objectives under s. 1.”107 This is quite a significant departure from the 
Court’s more typical stance, which is to treat the Schachter rule as a 
serious constraint.108 It is also a disquieting move. Justice Binnie’s 
                                                                                                             
102 NAPE, supra, note 1, at para. 72. 
103 Id., at para. 58. 
104 See also Jennifer Koshan’s detailed analysis of the fiscal situation in Newfoundland and 
Labrador at the time of the litigation and her conclusion that the fiscal situation was, in fact, 
“normal”. Koshan, supra, note 79, at para. 112. 
105 NAPE, supra, note 1, at para. 75. 
106 [1989] S.C.J. No. 125, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1384 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Lee”]. 
107 NAPE, supra, note 1, at para. 69 (emphasis in original). 
108 I have come across one other place in which the Schachter rule is ignored, namely, in 
Martin, where Gonthier J. cites Eldridge for the proposition that financial concerns can serve as 
substantial and compelling objectives. Martin, supra, note 17, at para. 109. However, in Eldridge, La 
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reconstruction of a cost-cutting decision as a policy choice illustrates 
how easily the Schachter rule can be circumvented — either for ulterior 
purposes or because it actually is impossible to disentangle some 
budgetary decisions from policy choices. Subsequent cases illustrate that 
this is likely to be a recurring dilemma. 
Health Services and Support — Facilities Sector Bargaining Assn. v. 
British Columbia,109 a decision handed down three years after NAPE, 
provides an example. Here, the wages of hospital workers were once 
more sacrificed in the name of cost-cutting, this time by the British 
Columbia government. The cost-cutting took the form of legislative 
cancellation of collective bargaining rights and agreements. The equality 
challenge failed. However, a section 2(d) argument was successful, in 
part. At section 1, the Court found that the legislative purpose was to 
save costs and thus could not serve as a substantial and compelling 
objective.110 It went on, however, to accept the concurrent purpose of 
improving health care delivery as substantial and compelling. Although 
the Court did not treat the objective as a “mix” of financial and other 
types of objectives, as Binnie J. suggests in NAPE, the case nonetheless 
illustrates how difficult it can be to give the Schachter rule any real 
force. The government’s claim in Health Services failed at a later stage of 
the proportionality analysis.111 
4. Withler and Frontloading the Proportionality Analysis 
The final stage in the shift in judicial attitudes towards limits on 
rights made in the name of financial considerations occurs specifically in 
the equality context, namely, in the Law to Withler line of cases. Under 
the rubric of “correspondence” in Law,112 as so many constitutional 
scholars pointed out in the decision’s wake, a version of the section 1 
proportionality analysis was frontloaded into the rights analysis stage of 
the Charter framework.113 This significantly undermined the effective-
                                                                                                             
Forest J. for the majority only assumed without deciding that the objective of “controlling health 
expenditures” is substantial and compelling. See discussion supra, notes 37 to 39. 
109 Supra, note 6. 
110 Id., at para. 147, per McLachlin C.J.C. and Bastarache J. for the majority. 
111 Id., at paras 150-161, per McLachlin C.J.C. and Bastarache J. for the majority. 
112 Supra, note 56, at paras. 69-71. 
113 For an analysis of the way in which the correspondence analysis in Law duplicates the 
s. 1 analysis, see Sheilah Martin, “Balancing Individual Rights to Equality and Social Goals” (2001) 
80 Can. Bar Rev. 299; Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, student ed. (Scarborough, ON: 
Carswell, 2002), at 1059; June Ross, “A Flawed Synthesis of the Law” (2000) 11(3) Const. F. Const. 
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ness of section 15 in achieving equality.114 Withler has revised the 
equality framework somewhat but preserved the language of correspon-
dence, now under the rubric of “stereotype”.115 Indeed, Withler has, if 
anything, expanded the number of situations in which courts can dismiss 
equality claims on the basis of governmental concerns, including financial 
concerns, at the rights analysis stage. The upshot is that in many cases, 
especially challenges to benefit regimes, courts need no longer grapple 
directly with the question of whether the government’s only pressing and 
substantial concern in limiting rights is saving money. Rather, such 
concerns become, at the initial rights violation stage of analysis, sub-
sumed under the rhetoric of “balancing competing interests” and “dis-
tributing scarce resources” as a way to describe the general character of a 
legislative regime. Such a character entitles legislatures to a measure of 
deference at this early stage in the analysis. The rules in Schachter and 
Provincial Judges Reference about budgetary considerations are com-
pletely irrelevant as, without the formal structure of section 1 analysis, 
there is no attention to whether financial concerns are or are not the 
exclusive or dominant legislative objective of the impugned provision, or 
whether the legislative measure is proportional. Withler is the key case as 
it cements into place this new equality framework and does so in the 
context of an under-inclusiveness challenge to social benefit regimes. 
As mentioned earlier, Withler concerned a challenge to provisions in 
two federal pension schemes that reduced death benefits for survivors, a 
group composed disproportionately of elderly women and one that is 
already subject to broader economic disadvantage. The reduction 
provisions meant that the older the survivor at the time of the death of the 
contributor, the less the amount of the benefit. The Court, in reasons by 
McLachlin C.J.C. and Abella J., stipulated that the analysis of the 
equality right and its infringement, in challenges involving such benefit 
programs, must take account of the legislative purposes of both the 
impugned provision and the scheme as a whole, concerns about the 
                                                                                                             
74; and Beverly Baines, “Law v. Canada: Formatting Equality” (2000) 11(3) Const. F. Const. 65. 
For an argument that Law directs the judicial focus, at the rights analysis stage, to a consideration of 
legislative objectives, see Ryder et al., supra, note 6, at 120. The authors also provide empirical 
support for the proposition that the correspondence analysis is the most important factor in 
determining the outcome of a s. 15 claim. Id., at 121-22. 
114 Ryder et al., id. 
115 Withler, supra, note 61, at para. 36. 
(2012), 58 S.C.L.R. (2d) MONEY AND THE LIMITS ON DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 327 
allocation of scarce resources and policy objectives.116 Jennifer Koshan 
and Jonette Hamilton note that the federal factum characterized the 
objective of the reduction provisions in purely financial terms, stating 
that unreduced benefits would be “financially prohibitive ... either 
because of the contribution required from younger employees or the tax 
attribution if it’s employer paid”.117 In Withler, the general character of 
the legislative scheme — in terms of distributing scarce resources, 
addressing competing needs or ameliorating disadvantage — entitles 
government to a more deferential standard of review at the rights-
infringement stage, with the result that the equality challenge is dis-
missed before getting to the fuller review of the governmental position at 
section 1.118 As Koshan and Hamilton point out, the more specific cost-
cutting as well as discriminatory objective of the impugned provisions 
does not actually feature in the examination of whether equality rights 
have been infringed.119 
In Withler, not only is section 1 bypassed, but the scope of the equal-
ity protection itself is further diminished. Before Withler, the frontload-
ing of the proportionality analysis to create an internal limitation on the 
scope of section 15 had significantly hampered the success rate of 
section 15 claims.120 Withler’s reaffirmation of the internal limit in 
expanded terms will further curtail the effectiveness of section 15, 
especially in social benefit cases, thereby further undermining the 
Court’s commitment to substantive equality.121 
                                                                                                             
116 Id., at para. 67. Note that the Court specified in Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] S.C.J. No. 29, 
[1998] 1 S.C.R. 493, at para. 109 (S.C.C.) that it is important in an under-inclusiveness challenge to 
look at both the general legislative purpose and that of the impugned provision at the “substantial 
and compelling objective” stage of s. 1 analysis. Withler brings this focus on both the overarching 
legislative purpose and the sub-purpose of the challenged provision into the rights analysis stage. 
117 Koshan & Hamilton, supra, note 83, at 55. 
118 Withler, supra, note 61, at para. 38. See also the more extensive analysis of this aspect of 
Withler in Koshan & Hamilton, supra, note 83, at 58-60. 
119 Koshan & Hamilton, id. 
120 Sujit Choudry and Claire Hunter, in “Measuring Judicial Activism on the Supreme Court 
of Canada: A Comment on Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v. NAPE” (2003) 48 McGill L.J. 525, 
treat s. 15 rights as ones in which courts have read in an internal limitation to the scope of the rights 
(what I have described as frontloading the proportionality analysis), and therefore, those in which 
one can expect a lower government “win” rate at s. 1 compared to rights the scope of which are 
relatively unlimited. The empirical data in their study support this hypothesis. The government 
success rate at s. 1 in s. 15 cases was 20 per cent, compared to 44.4 per cent in s. 2(b) cases. The 
latter rights have very few internal limits. Id., at 551. They also found that the lower the government 
win rate at s. 1, the higher its win rate overall is likely to be. Thus, s. 15 cases, with a lower win rate 
for government at s. 1, have a higher win rate for government than s. 2(b) cases. Id., at 552. 
121 Koshan & Hamilton, supra, note 83, at 56 make much the same point, as well as a num-
ber of others regarding the failure of Withler to move beyond the doctrinal features of equality 
jurisprudence that hamper the development of a substantive approach. Id., at 59-61. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The four junctures sketched out above capture key moments in the 
jurisprudence concerning “dollars versus rights”, more specifically 
equality rights. It is a bleak story that begins with Wilson J. in Singh 
taking the moral high ground and ends with compromise in every 
possible direction. The bleakness does not reside in the fact that the 
jurisprudence, together with the pattern of wins and losses mapped out in 
the first part, indicate that money does indeed limit justice. The tension 
between scarcity and justice is an abiding theme in liberal societies. Most 
of us accept that “money” and the scarcity of other sorts of resources 
limit justice. The bleakness lies in the failure of the jurisprudence to yield 
a workable framework for navigating the justice/scarcity tension in a 
principled way. The history of equality rights provides a particularly 
disheartening overview of this failure. 
Robert Charney and Daniel Guttman have argued that if equality 
rights are given substantive positive content, then courts should and must 
factor in financial constraints.122 I agree with that position stated broadly 
in that way. However, I have two concerns. My concern is first and 
foremost that Charney and Guttman’s first premise, namely, that we give 
substantive content to equality, remains unattainable except in cases 
where the financial stakes are very low. Indeed, the Court’s unwilling-
ness to assert principle over utility in the equality realm converges with a 
failure, now for almost three decades, to give equality rights substantive 
content, and indeed, recently, with the explicit characterization of section 
15(1) as a negative protection.123 As the record since the first benefit case 
in 1991 indicates, only inexpensive substantive equality claims or ones in 
which the budgetary impact is conceded by the Crown to be insignificant 
— Tétreault-Gadoury, Schachter, Eldridge, Martin and Hislop — succeed. 
It should also be noted that, except for Eldridge, these are all cases that 
fit fairly comfortably into a formal equality paradigm. Unless a viable 
framework for seriously engaging with governmental concerns about 
budgetary impacts can be developed, there would seem to be little hope 
for a more meaningful substantive equality jurisprudence. 
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This brings me to my second concern: what should a viable frame-
work for addressing the costs of rights recognition look like? This is the 
“big picture” doctrinal question. I do not think one can complain about 
the “follow the money” pattern as well as demand a more robust substan-
tive equality jurisprudence if the only approach to the “dollars versus 
rights” controversy on offer is an uncompromising version of Wilson J.’s 
stance. On the other hand, the current situation, in which financial 
impacts can be invoked at almost every stage of analysis, often foreclos-
ing exploration of key aspects of the claim, is also unacceptable. Financial 
impacts do need to be seriously considered at some point. In particular, 
we need a “big picture” approach to the issue of where to locate that 
consideration, and how to do so in a way that takes account of and respects 
the many other fundamental questions raised in a full and meaningful 
consideration of rights claims with a distributive justice component. 
Some have already taken up this discussion, and their thoughts pro-
vide a useful starting point. Charney and Guttman argue that govern-
ments should be able to argue that financial constraints are substantial 
and compelling objectives.124 Wiseman argues against this and against 
the now well-entrenched practice of invoking either injusticiability 
doctrine or a deferential standard of review at the proportionality analysis 
where scarce financial resources are being distributed or large financial 
impacts are at play.125 Instead, he urges that many budgetary concerns 
should be addressed at the remedy stage, and the remedial response 
should include what he calls competence-building measures.126 His prime 
example of the latter is the Provincial Judges Reference, in which the 
majority set out the general features of an institutional framework for 
ensuring judicial independence while at the same time giving govern-
ments leeway to control budgets and determine judges’ salaries in an 
arm’s-length manner.127 His second example is Doucet-Boudreau v. Nova 
Scotia (Minister of Education),128 a case pursued under section 23 of the 
Charter, in which in the same way, the majority approved the approach of 
the trial judge, who set out a framework within which the province of 
Nova Scotia had to make its “best efforts” to build five schools required 
by section 23.129 In other words, the courts in these instances are not 
                                                                                                             
124 Charney & Guttman, supra, note 122, at 157. 
125 “Competence Concerns”, supra, note 10, at 524-32. 
126 Id., at 540-45. 
127 Id., at 540-42. 
128 [2003] S.C.J. No. 63, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.). 
129 “Competence Concerns”, supra, note 10, at 532-45. 
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ordering legislatures to directly fund a benefit or program, but rather 
setting out normative and institutional frameworks within which gov-
ernments can manage resources and rights in a way that takes seriously 
the latter. 
The current messy doctrinal situation requires that we pursue these 
and other ideas, and that the overarching framework for judicial analysis 
of the justice/scarcity tension be given serious consideration by academ-
ics, lawyers and judges. It is particularly important to situate the discus-
sion in terms of the larger conceptions of public and private at play at 
this political juncture, and to navigate the encounter between welfare 
liberalism and neo-liberalism that so often underpins the social benefits 
challenges in a more self-reflective and creative way. The Charter cannot 
return us to the post-war era, but it should not, as in Gosselin, serve to 
erase or exacerbate the injustice of poverty and extreme social insecurity 
or, as in Hodge and Withler, to ignore the disproportionate impacts of 
such injustices on groups such as elderly women who experience 
marginalization in multiple dimensions. 
There are other, more pedestrian but strategically crucial questions 
arising out of the empirical overview of the cases presented here. Some 
of them I have already raised in the course of my discussion. The first 
few questions have to do with the evidential precondition for deference 
to government decisions. First, it makes sense that where budgetary 
impacts are raised as a serious concern, governments should be required 
to provide convincing evidence of such impacts before deference is 
accorded. Evidence as to the proportion of the budget represented by 
the impact should be a more routine element in this evidence, as the 
absolute dollar figure by itself reveals little. Also, distinctions between 
claims where the number of claimants is numerically fixed (the Tétreault-
Gadoury and NAPE situations), claims where expanded government 
liability will be ongoing into the future (the Egan situation) and claims 
where both of these are true (the Auton and Law situations), should carry 
more weight. Second, once a budgetary impact is convincingly estab-
lished, courts should also strictly scrutinize any additional claim that 
budgetary trade-offs between competing groups are involved. Only when 
one or both of these aspects of the governmental claim is established, 
should deference be accorded rights violating measures. As well, I would 
question whether budgetary trade-offs, without any evidence that serious 
budgetary constraints demand such trade-offs, should be entitled to 
the kind of “carte blanche” deference represented by Sopinka J.’s stance 
in Egan. Rather, it is consistent with the judicial role to require that 
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constitutional values feature importantly in legislative decision-making 
involving complex policy choices. 
The next questions pertain to the lack of nuance in the characteriza-
tion of legislative regimes when deciding whether courts should defer. 
Thus, my third question is whether we need to ask whether equality 
claims that are about the distribution of financial benefits, goods in cash, 
should be treated differently from claims that are about the distribution of 
goods in kind. Many successful equality challenges to financial benefit 
regimes — such as pensions or income assistance — can be addressed, 
as they were in Schachter, by Parliament or the legislature equalizing 
down and thereby recognizing equality rights but mitigating the financial 
costs of doing so. With regimes that distribute goods in kind — such as 
medical treatments or sign language translation — there is often a clear 
price tag on rights recognition, but without the option of equalizing down, 
short of drastically reconfiguring or shutting down the entire program 
in question. Should legislative regimes that distribute financial benefits 
therefore be accorded less deference? 
The fourth question is also about nuance. Should cases that are about 
social insurance schemes that are largely, if not entirely, self-sustaining 
be distinguished from cases that are about programs that governments 
fund out of tax revenues? Hislop is perhaps the most helpful case in 
this regard. The CPP, the regime under challenge in Hislop, is funded, 
not out of general tax revenues, but out of contributions by workers and 
their employers.130 Justifying under-inclusiveness towards some of the 
contributors to the pension fund on the grounds of burdens on the “public 
purse” seems much less acceptable when the “purse” is really funded by 
and for contributors, including those being excluded, rather than when 
the purse is funded by all of us who meet taxation thresholds, to be 
redistributed in a fair and equitable manner for a range of purposes from 
environmental assessment processes to fighter jets to social assistance. 
Indeed, this distinction may partly explain why the Crown in Hislop 
conceded that the financial impact of a liability for $50 million would be 
insignificant, and why the majority felt comfortable with an award that 
imposed a liability of roughly $30 million. 
To conclude, the general point I am making is that Binnie J.’s refer-
ence to the “dollars versus rights controversy” covers a range of situa-
                                                                                                             
130 Canada, Office of the Chief Actuary, “Optimal Funding of the Canada Pension Plan: 
Actuarial Study No. 6”, April 2007, online: <http://www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/app/DocRepository/1/eng/
oca/studies/Optimal_Funding_CPP_e.pdf>, at 13. 
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tions that are significantly different. One way to approach the contro-
versy is to start, as Wiseman has done, with the large theoretical ques-
tions about institutional competence and legitimacy. Another approach is 
to assume, as I have done, that there are good reasons for the judicial 
reluctance to intervene in legislative decisions with direct budgetary 
consequences but that nonetheless, this does not excuse a messy, inco-
herent approach at the level of doctrine and adjudicative process. Perhaps 
if we work at the issue from multiple angles, we will end up with more 
clarity at multiple levels: political, conceptual, doctrinal and procedural. 
